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Abstract
An asynchronous wrapper of a fabricated GALS system
is analyzed for hazards. For this purpose a Petri net based
modelling approach of this GALS wrapper is presented. In
our model the question whether a hazard can occur in a
gate is reduced to a model checking problem: the reacha-
bility of a particular marking in the Petri net. In order to
alleviate state space explosion three techniques to reduce
the model’s state space are presented. By use of these tech-
niques we detected several potential hazards in the wrapper.
1. Introduction
Globally Asynchronous Locally Synchronous(GALS)
systems is an approach for the design of circuits that has
been suggested by Chapiro in 1984 [1]. The idea of GALS
is to combine the advantages of synchronous and asynchro-
nous design methodologies while avoiding their disadvan-
tages. Usually, a GALS system is defined as a set oflo-
cally synchronous blockscommunicating with each other
via asynchronous wrappers. Hence, the asynchronous part
of a GALS system is limited to its wrappers. A wrapper is
a not too large circuit. This reduces conventional problems
of asynchronous system design, in particular problems of
exhaustive tests.
Still, an asynchronous wrapper must be tested, too. The
main challenge in designing a wrapper is to avoidhazards.
A hazard is an effect where the level of the output signal
of a gate changes to an undefined value, due to “too dense”
edges on the signal.
Unfortunately potential hazards are hard to detect and
hence, require a complete, formal model of the wrapper.
The problem of hazard detection in asynchronous systems
is not new. One well known approach usesSignal Transi-
tion Graphs(STGs), a special Petri net class. By help of the
tool Petrify a circuit modelled as a STG is synthesized. In
the end the model is transformed into a hazard-free repre-
sentation (see [2]). In a different approach, the authors of
[5] successfully verified a GALS system by use of a verifi-
cation framework, calledprocess spaces. A process consid-
ers the set of all possible executions, but without referring
to their structural details. Hazards then are calculated by a
tool calledFIREMAPS. The authors detected several haz-
ards and other pitfalls in the analyzed system.
Only few GALS systems have been synthesized and fab-
ricated so far. As a case study, in this paper we analyze the
asynchronous wrapper of a GALS system that performs a
baseband processor [7]. To verify the given GALS wrapper
for potential hazards, we firstly tried to transform our wrap-
per into a STG by use of tool support, but we failed. To gen-
erate the STG by hand also failed, because the wrapper has
too many signals. As a result we decided for a different ap-
proach. For each gate type of the given wrapper aPetri net
patternis built. In our model a signals is represented by a
placep with a token onp if an edge occurs ats. We further-
more save the internal states of a gate, i.e. the levels of all
signals in the pattern. This way, a pattern preserves all infor-
mation needed to detect hazards. The wrapper is then just a
plugged composition of several instances of those patterns.
The question whether a hazard can occur in a gate is reduced
to a model checking problem: ther achabilityof a particu-
lar marking in the Petri net. The resulting net is far too large
for model checking. But it can decisively be reduced while
preserving potential hazards. Besides some basic reduction
techniques we suggest a further reduction technique: Upon
investigating potential hazards at one gate, the behavior of
all other gates may besimulated. We suggestabstract pat-
ternsfor this purpose. This allowed us to detect further po-
tential hazards. Based on the potential hazards we detected,
the wrapper has significantly been improved.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the GALS wrapper. Our modelling ap-
proach is presented in section 3. Section 4 deals with the
verification of the model and in particular with state space
reduction. In section 5 we explain our method for hazard
detection.
2. GALS Wrapper
In [6] we suggested a novel request-driven GALS tech-
nique. There proposed asynchronous wrappers are de-
ployed in the complex GALS chip as we presented in
[7]. This chip performs the baseband processing compli-
ant to the wireless LAN standard IEEE 802.11a. The base-
band processor has datapath architecture with point-to-point
communication. The communication between processor
blocks is very intensive (w.r.t. the clock cycle of the local
clock) but bursty, with longer periods of inactivity. Three
important aspects motivated us to apply the novel request-
driven GALS technique in the wireless communication en-
vironment. Firstly, it was our goal to establish a general and
user-friendly design framework for reliable integration of
large digital systems with one or more clock domains. Sec-
ondly, much of our effort is dedicated to EMI and crosstalk
reduction in order to ease the integration of mixed-signal
designs. Thirdly, it is our goal to avoid unnecessary transi-
tions and the associated waste of energy during data transfer
between GALS blocks. The fabricated GALS baseband is
tested and shows superior dynamic power and noise char-
acteristics in comparison with the respective synchronous
version of the same processor.
The principle architecture of the used asynchronous
wrapper around a locally synchronous module is shown in
Fig. 1. Conceptually, the locally synchronous circuit can
be driven both by the incoming request as well as the lo-
cal clock signal. The driver of the request input signal is
the output of the asynchronous wrapper of the predecessor
block. It is aligned with the transferred data, and can be
considered as a token carrier.
The proposed wrapper implements the following sce-
nario: When a data burst is being received, the respective
GALS block operates in a request-driven mode, i.e. it is
possible to synchronize the local clock generators with the
request input signal. In this way unnecessary transitions




















































Figure 1. Block diagram of the proposed asyn-
chronous wrapper
and there is no activity on the input handshake lines, the
data stored inside the locally synchronous pipeline has to be
processed and flushed out. This can be achieved by switch-
ing to a mode of operations in which a local clock generator
drives the GALS block independently. To control the tran-
sition from request driven operation to the local clock gen-
eration mode, a time-out function is proposed. The time-
out function is triggered when the input request line of the
GALS block is idle for a certain period of time, but data that
has to be processed is still stored in internal pipeline stages.
When there is no incoming request signal for a certain
period of time (defined as aTtime−out), the circuit enters
a new state where it can internally generate clock cycles
using a local ring oscillator. The number of internally gen-
erated clock cycles is set to match the depth of the locally
synchronous pipeline. When there is no valid token in the
synchronous block, the local clock will stall and the circuit
remains inactive until the next request transition, indicating
that a fresh data token has appeared at the input port. This
way we avoid possible energy waste.
More complex and demanding is the scenario when after
time-out and starting of the local-clock generation, a new
request appears before the synchronous pipeline is emptied.
In this case, first it is necessary to complete the present local
clock cycle. Subsequently, it is possible to safely hand over
clock generation from the local ring oscillator to the input
request line. To deal with this situation it is necessary to
implement additional circuitry to prevent metastability and
hazards in the system.
The asynchronous wrapper consists of theinput port, the
output port, local clock generator, time-out generator, and
a clock control circuit, as can be seen from Fig. 1. Addi-
tionally, input data are buffered in a transparent latch. This
is needed to prevent metastability at the input of the locally
synchronous block.
The role of the input port is to perform the input and
internal handshake and to grant safe input transfer of the
data. Additionally, the input port resets time-out and clock
control circuitry after every handshake. This port mainly
consists of an input controller and few supporting gates.
The input controller must guarantee safe data transfer and
it is implemented as an Asynchronous Finite State Machine
(AFSM) working in burst mode.
The role of the output port is to safely perform the out-
put handshake of the GALS block. Subsequently until the
handshake is finished, appearance of new clock cycle will
be disabled. When there is no output data to be transferred,
the output port passively acknowledges any internal request.
It consists of an AFSM output controller and few additional
gates.
The time-out generation unit is implemented with a
small number of hardware components. Generally it con-
sists of one counter that counts the number of negative
edges of the local clock. This counter is designed as a stan-
dard synchronous counter. When reaching its final value
eventually it generates a time-out signal. On the other hand,
the counter’s reset signal is activated once during every in-
put port handshake. Therefore, time-out signals can be gen-
erated only when the input handshake channel has been in-
active sufficiently long.
A local clock generator (LCG) triggers the time-out mea-
surement. Additionally, when time-out is reached it gener-
ates clocks for a LS block. A LCG could be stretched from
both input and output ports. The local clock generator is im-
plemented as a ring oscillator and the structure of the LCG
is described in [9]. Generally, a LCG consists of delay line,
C-element, arbitration section and one NOR-gate for en-
able/disable function. A delayline is designed in such way
that the tunability of the clock generator is granted. Tun-
ability is a very important property of the proposed LCG in
order to calibrate the clock frequency and to avoid the effect
of changes of processes, temperature, or voltage.
To increase power-saving capabilities, a Clock control
block is designed. The role of this block is to count the
number of locally generated clock cycles. When the LS
pipeline is empty, the local clock generation is disabled.
In order to grant safe data-flow in GALS system we
must be certain that the wrapper behaves hazard- and glitch-
free. However, this is not possible without complete formal
analysis of the asynchronous wrapper. Details of this ap-
proach will be given in following sections and the analysis
results helped us to improve the reliability of the asynchro-
nous wrapper.
3. A Petri net based modelling approach for
analyzing hazards
3.1. Petri net models of wrapper gates
Proof of the asynchronous wrapper’s correctness re-
quires aformal modelof the wrapper. To this end, a mod-
elling technique is required that is in particular capable to
represent the interplay of gates, signals, signal levels and
signal edges.
We have chosenelementary Petri nets, i.e. nets where
each place can carry at most one token. Readers not familiar
with this notion are referred to [10], for instance. Places will
be used to represent two different aspects of gates: Firstly
each signals is assigned a placep. One may expect a token
on p to represent a value ofs, e.g. the valuehigh, and cor-
respondingly no token to representlow. We will however
interpret places and tokens fundamentally different: a to-
ken onp represents anedgeon s. The token does not show
whether the edge is rising or falling. Places of this kind will
be denoted asedge places.
The second aspect to be represented by places, are the
actual levels of signals. Receiving a signal edge, a gate may
react in different ways, depending on the actual level of a
fixed set of signals. To capture this behavior properly, the
Petri net model of a gate has a number of places, repre-
senting potential combinations of the level of some signals.
Those places will be denoted aslevel places. Details will
become obvious in the forthcoming sections.
The idea of edge places has been suggested by Gomm
in [4] already, and employed to some state independent
properties of gates, in particular of Mutex and Muller C-
elements. Level places have been used by Genrich and
Shapiro, to model and verify an arbiter cascade [3]. We sug-
gest to combine both ideas. This will allow to characterize
hazards.
The wrapper is composed of quite a number of instances
of gates. Each gate is a logic gate, a flip-flop, a counter, a
Mutex or a Muller C-element. We constructed a Petri net
pattern for each gate. The wrapper’s Petri net model is then
just composed from instances of the corresponding patterns.
The following two sections describe two such patterns in
detail.
3.2. The pattern for the AND gate
We start with a representation of the AND gate. An AND
gate consists of three signals,a, b andc, such thatc = a ∧
b. The AND gate updates (i.e. re-computes the level of)c
whenevera or b have been updated (i.e. have been given
new levels from outside the gate). In general, a pattern is
depicted as a dashed box. Inside the box, the structure of
the corresponding gate is modelled. Outside the box the
nodes of the interface are depicted.
The AND gate is represented by the help of fourinternal
states, representing the combinations of the levels of the
signalsa andb, i.e. the four logic gate levels. The actual
state may change due to the change of the actual level of
one of the signalsa andb by the occurrence of an edge at
one of the two signals. Obviously we do not need to save
the level of output signalc, because it can be calculated by
the given levels of input signalsa andb.
Fig. 2 shows our Petri net model of the AND gate: Its
internal states are represented by the level placesb, āb, ab̄
















Figure 2. AND pattern
of signalsa and b are high. If the placēab is taken, the
level of a is low and the level ofb is high. ab̄ and āb̄ are
now obvious. In every reachable marking, exactly one of
the four level places carries a token.
Fig. 2 exhibits three more places,a, b andc, the edge
places. Placea represents the potential (enforced) edge
change at the signala: A token on placea represents an
edge which indicates that the actual level of signala t the
AND gate must change. A token on placea activates one of
the four upper transitions. For example, a token on the place
āb together with a token ona, activates the upmost transi-
tion, t1. In this situation the level ofa is low and the level
of b is high, hence, the level ofc low. The token on placea
indicates that the level of signalis due to swap, concretely,
to change from low to high. As the levels of botha andb are
high, the level ofc must turn high, too. Thus, occurrence of
t1 in Fig. 2 yields a token onc, indicating a change of the
level of c from low to high, i.e. a rising edge. As a further
example transitiont4 transforms the statēab̄ into the state
ab̄. Both states imply that the level ofc is low. Hence, there
is no arc fromt4 to c.
The pattern of Fig. 2 is intended to receive signal edges
on placesa andb, and to potentially produce edges on place
c. Therefore,a and b are input edge places, and c is an
output edge placeof the AND pattern. In technical terms an
input edge placep has arcs fromp to some transition of the
pattern; an output edge place,q, has arcs from transitions of
the pattern toq.
3.3. The pattern for the Mutex gate
Next we present the pattern of the Mutex gate. A Mutex
gate consists of four signalsa, b, a out andb out. For each
input signala andb, respectively, there exist one output sig-
nal a out andb out, respectively. When both input signals
are low, both output signals are low, too. When now one of
the input signal’s level changes to high, the level of the cor-
responding output signal changes to high, too and the level
of the other output signal cannot change to high as long as
the first output signal is high. If the level of both input sig-
nals change to high simultaneously, the circuit tosses a coin
to decide which of the output signals changes to high. In
other words, Mutex guarantees that the levels of both sig-
nalsa out andb out are never high at the same time.
The Mutex gate is represented by the help of five internal
states, representing the possible combinations of the levels
of the signalsa, b, a out andb out. As already explained in
section 3.2, the actual state may change due to the change



















Figure 3. Mutex pattern
rence of an edge of one of the two signals. In contrast to
the AND pattern it is not sufficient to save only the level of
the two input signals. We must also save the levels of both
output signals in order to distinguish between the two pos-
sibilities if the level of both input signals is high, because
in this scenario we have to block the level change of one of
the output signals.
Fig. 3 shows the pattern of the Mutex gate. It is similar
to the AND pattern presented in Fig. 2. Its internal states
are represented by the places1110, 1010, 0000, 0101 and
1101, where the numbers 0 and 1 visualize the level ofa, b,
a out andb out, respectively.
Proper behavior of the Mutex pattern can be studied by
considering the 10 transitions one by one. We leave this as
an exercise to the reader.
3.4. Patterns for the other element types
In addition to the AND gate and the Mutex gate, the re-
maining gate types, i.e. logic gates, flip-flop, counter and
Muller C-element, are likewise assigned patterns of elemen-
tary Petri nets, following the principles already applied in
section 3.2 and 3.3: Each gate has its set of input and output
signals, with each signals represented as a Petri net place,
p. A token onp represents an edge at signals, where the
gate is enforced to change the level of signals. Hence,
the gate’s Petri net pattern is expected to contain an en-
abled transition, consuming the token. The occurrence of
that transition changes the internal state of the pattern rep-
resented as a token on a level place and it may also produce
new tokens on places representing the gate’s output signals.
3.5. Potential hazards
A hazard occurs in a gate in case two preconditions
match: Firstly,structural conditions: a gate’s structure al-
lows for local states that in case of “unsound” input signals
allow for a confusing result. For example, the AND gate
has this kind of local states, whereas the Mutex gate has no
such structure. Secondly,temporal conditions: it is possible
to change the level of more than one signal in a short tim-
ing interval, i.e. edges of at least two different signals occur
at nearly the same time. For example, in the AND gate it
is possible that the edges of signala andb occur in a very
short timing interval.
Having this in mind we can define the following criteria
of a potential hazard in a pattern:
Definition 1 (Potential Hazard in a pattern). Let G be a
pattern and letM be a marking ofG where each input edge
place and no output edge place carries a token. LetM ′ be
reachable fromM with an output edge place carrying more
than one token. Then the patternG is hazard prone.
Accordingly, in our patterns, detection of a hazard is re-
duced to the reachability of a marking.
As an example for the AND pattern of Fig. 2 assume
tokens ona, b andāb. Then occurrence of transitionst1 and
t7 yields two tokens onc.
We characterized hazardous states of gates by help of
markingsM with two tokens on an output edge place. This
is intuitively reasonable, because this denotes a signal with-
out sufficient delay between two edges. Instead of char-
acterizing hazards by such markingsM , one characterize
them by the markingsM ′ that maycauseM . For example,
the markingM ′ of the AND pattern with a token ona, b
andāb with t1 followed by t7 leads to a marking with two
tokens onc. This likewise applies toM ′′ with tokens ona,
b andab̄. Hence, a hazard can be identified in a pattern by
markingsM∗ thatmaycause two tokens on an output edge
place. This in mind, we now turn to markings with two to-
kens on a output edge place, caused by “normal” behavior
of gates. For each gate, those markingsM∗ can uniquely
be identified.
3.6. Reducing the state space of reachable markings
The GALS wrapper can be modelled by composing a
number of instances of the 7 gate patterns. This results in
a Petri net with about 288 places and 526 transitions. Each
reachable state of the wrapper is represented as a reachable
marking of this Petri net. Vice versa, a number of markings
is reachable in the Petri net that wouldnot correspond to
reachable states of the wrapper. Those states are not reach-
able due to relations among the gate delays.
As an example, assume two gatesA andB, with a signal
s obtaining edges fromA that are consumed byB. Fig. 4
outlines the corresponding part of the wrapper model. Gate
A is assumed to be hazard-free. Furthermore, assume each
switching of B takes less time than any switching ofA.
s
A B
Figure 4. gates A and B, linked by signal s
Consequently, each edge rising ats is consumed byB, be-
fore the next edge appearing ats. In terms of the model, this
would mean that no reachable marking has two tokens ons.
But the model does not respect delay times so far. Con-
sequently, a reachable markingM is conceivable with two
tokens ons. Generally speaking, the set of reachable mark-
ings of the Petri net model could drastically be reduced if we
would respect delay times of the gates. This in fact would be
feasible by help oftimed Petri nets. We applied an entirely
different approach, however. It is based on the observation
that the designer of the wrapper exploits delay times not in
order to guarantee any real time behavior, but just to avoid
“dangerously close” edges on one signal. As we want the
model only to detect hazards, we may abstract away any
real time aspects, and just model the assumption that delay
times guarantee absence of “close edges” on a signal. This
is easily achieved in the Petri net model by help of the well-
known concept ofcomplement places. We extend the model
by the complement places,,̄ for each edge place,s. Fig. 5
outlines this construct. As a consequence, the number of
A Bs
s
Figure 5. gates A and B, linked by signal s and
its complement place
places of the wrapper model increases from 288 to 363.
The resulting net’s reachable markings still represent all
reachable states of the wrapper. Hazards are just no longer
represented by two tokens on a place.
3.7. Verification
As we showed in section 3.6, the detection of a potential
hazard of the wrapper is reduced to the reachabilty prob-
lem of some distinguished markings in the Petri net model.
Reachability is a typical problem to be tackled by a model
checker. We employedLoLA, an explicit model checker
[13]. Its features include powerful reduction techniques
such as symmetry detection [12], partial order reduction
[11] and the sweep-line method [14]. LoLA reduces the
wrapper model from 363 places to 243 places. Still, the
space of potentially reachable states has the magnitude of
about2243 elements, far too many to be tackled by conven-
tional PC technology.
LoLA provides techniques to solicit short paths to given
reachable markings. Those techniques have successfully
been applied to detect some potential hazards.
Exhaustive search of the state space, however, has not
been feasible with LoLA.
As an alternative, we tried theSMV model checker [8]
that is very popular for hardware verification. But we failed
again, due to the state space explosion. This remained also
after SMV-tuned simplification of the model.
4. Abstraction of the model
As the model’s state space exceeds any model checker’s
capacity, further reductions of the model were useful, pro-
vided they preserve hazards. We suggest three such tech-
niques in this section.
4.1. Integrating gates
The state space of a model of the GALS wrapper can
be reduced by integration of several instances of its logic
gates. An almost trivial integration step is the replacement
of two instances of a gate into one instance. Fig. 6 shows a








Figure 6. part of the output port
be replaced by the model of Fig. 7. Fig. 8 shows a more





Figure 7. integrated OR gates
OR gate. Though we did not show the internal structure of









Figure 8. sequential logic gates
two input signals and one output signal, and that an edge
will occur at signale whenever one of the AND gates has
switched ande’s level is changed.
The idea is to integrate the three gates of Fig. 8 into one
pattern, as outlined in Fig. 9. We refrain from detailing the






Figure 9. integrated gates
of an edge of signala, b, c or d fires exactly one transition.
The circuit of Fig. 8 includes3 · 8 = 24 transitions and
6 + 1 + 3 · 4 = 19 places (6 input, 1 output and 12 level
places). To change the level of signale, at least two transi-
tions have to occur: Firstly, the level of one of both AND
gates have to change. Secondly, the level of signale has
to change. The pattern in Fig. 9 consists of4 · 16 = 64
transitions and4 + 1 + 24 = 21 places (4 input, 1 output
and 16 level places). This does not seem to be much of an
improvement at first glance, because the number of places
and transitions increased. But in the context of tool based
analysis, the bottleneck is not the number of places or tran-
sitions, but the number ofstates, more precisely the number
of intermediate states. And the latter is drastically reduced
as each change of signale’s level implies that at least one
transition fires.
Integrating the three gates of Fig. 8 minimizes the num-
ber of states from 4,621,595 to 2,133,526 by use of the
model checker LoLA. In this run LoLA combined partial
order reduction and the sweep-line method.
We applied the above technique to seven components of
the wrapper. This reduced the entire wrapper model from
363 places and 526 transitions to 278 places and 493 tran-
sitions. LoLA reduced the wrapper model from 243 to 201
places.
The full state space of the reduced model is still too large
for being handled by LoLA or by SMV. So, it was inevitable
to search for additional reduction techniques.
4.2. Causalities
The correctness of a wrapper depends frequently on as-
sumptions about the delays of its gates. We did not model
this aspect so far. As a consequence, the model may yield
states – and hence potential hazards – that in reality are
known not to occur. We suggest not to model assumptions
on gate delays, but only their effect to the gate’s behavior,
in particular the effect to the order of signal edges and con-
sequently the order of gate switching operations.
As an example, consider the flip-flop in the context as in
Fig. 7. The delay gate guarantees that the flip-flop processes
the reset edge (rst) before the clock edge (clk).
The flip-flop pattern can be extended by additional con-
trol places, guaranteeing this behavior. We refrain from go-
ing into details here.
4.3. The Simplification Technique
In section 4.1 and 4.2 we presented two techniques that
firstly reduce the state space of the model and secondly pre-
serve all potential hazards. Unfortunately the state space
was too large for being handled by LoLA or by SMV, so, it
was inevitable to search for additional reduction techniques.
As mentioned in section 2 the wrapper consists of five sub-
circuits. Table 1 shows the state space for each subcircuit
calculated by LoLA using partial order reduction and the






local clock generator 17
Table 1. state space of the wrapper’s subcir-
cuits
gateG, only the level information ofG are needed. From
G’s environment we only have to preserve the level change
of the signals. Thus, we can built simplified, more precisely,
abstract patterns for each subcircuit. An abstract subcir-
cuit is the composition of abstract gate patterns plugged to-
gether. In such an abstract gate pattern we tried to avoid the
use of level places whenever possible. As a consequence,
potential hazards inside this subcircuit cannot be detected.
This pattern only preserves the level changes of the signals.
Finally, the wrapper is composed by plugging four abstract
subcircuits and one concrete subcircuit, whereas the latter
embeds gateG which has to be checked for hazards. By
flexible change of abstract and concrete patterns of the five
subcircuits we can search for every potential hazard. We
only need five wrapper models instead of one. In the fol-
lowing we show an example of an abstract pattern and fur-
ther how we proved its correctness concerning its concrete
pattern.
The wrapper includes a subcircuit, generating the local
clock (LCG), as shown in Fig. 10. As initial state of the
LCG assume theSTOPIsignal high, and all other signals
low. The clock is now triggered bySTOPIfalling low. Due










Figure 10. Simplified block structure of the
LCG
causingRCLK to rise. Then both Mutex gates switch, fol-
lowed by AND and C-element (MCE). This completes a
cycle, now starting its second round by switching the NOR
gate now with the effect of lowering theRCLKsignal.
This circuit is apt to stretching the clock phase. This is
achieved by rising edges atREQI1or STRETCH. The effect
of those edges is to block (i.e. to delay) the change of signal
RCLK’s level from low to high.
The simplified version of the Mutex gate reduces the set
of places from 48 to 44 and the set of transitions from 52
to 40. Replacing in the LCG of Fig. 10 one of the Mu-
tex patterns of Fig. 3 with its abstract counterpart of Fig.
11, reduces the state space from 2440 states to 1470 states














Figure 11. abstract Mutex pattern
gates of Fig. 10 can adequately be detailed by the pattern of
Fig. 3.
A formal proof by help of the LoLA analysis tool re-
vealed that the two transitionst5 andt6 of both instances
of the Mutex pattern are never enabled. Hence the pattern
of Fig. 3 can be replaced by the simpler pattern of Fig.
11 without affecting the Mutex gate’s behavior in the LCG.
The inscriptions of the internal states of the pattern of Fig.
11 refers to the level of the output signalsout andb out.
Building abstract patterns it was necessary to prove
whether the abstract pattern behaves like the concrete pat-
tern. For that purpose the abstract pattern has to change
the level of its output signals whenever the concrete pattern
does. Informally spoken, for each transition that can oc-
cur in the concrete pattern in Fig. 3 we have to find one
or more transition in the abstract pattern in Fig. 11 and the
latter pattern has to behave like the former. The transitions
of both patterns then form a relation, known as aimula-
tion. If there is at least one transition in the concrete pattern
which has no counterpart in the abstract pattern, it can be
expressed by an internal transition, denoted as a so called
τ -step. Hence, the relation is called aweak simulation.
Table 2 visualizes the relation of the concrete and ab-
stract Mutex pattern, which is a weak simulation. Note, the
two transitions in the concrete Mutex (t5, t6) that could not
be enabled are not considered. The table demonstrates that









Table 2. weak simulation between concrete
and abstract Mutex pattern
the concrete Mutex model is weakly simulated by the ab-
stract Mutex model (because of theτ -steps). Thus, Fig. 11
is a correct abstraction of Fig. 3 and it preserves the level
change of all signals. In fact, we built an abstract LCG that
weakly simulates the concrete pattern of the LCG. This ab-
stract LCG reduces the set of places from 48 to 30 and the
set of transitions from 52 to 15. In contrast to 2440 states in
the concrete LCG the abstract LCG reduces the state space
to 92 states which is a reduction of more than 96%. By
use of partial order reduction and the sweep-line method
the number of states is reduced from 17 (see Table 1) to 6.
In addition to the LCG we also simplified output port,
time-out generator and clock control to check the input port
for potential hazards. With it we simplified the wrapper’s
model for a better analysis with LoLA. The respective wrap-
per is reduced to 143 places and 177 transitions and LoLA
reduced the number of places to 89. The full state space
could not be calculated by LoLA, but by SMV. Neverthe-
less, instead of SMV we used LoLA to search for markings
of possible hazards, because most of the markings were cal-
culated after short time and there was no need to calculate
the full state space. Next, we will give more detailed infor-
mation about our synthesis procedure.
5. Hazard Detection
We presented a method to reduce the state space of a
Petri net model of a GALS wrapper in the last section. The
techniques presented in section 4.1 and 4.2 preserve all po-
tential hazards in the model. In contrast, the use of abstract
patterns as presented in section 4.3 only preserves all po-
tential hazard in a concrete subcircuit. Nevertheless, all po-
tential hazards of the whole wrapper can be detected by re-
placing a concrete subcircuit by its abstract counterpart and
vice versa. As already mentioned, this implies more than
one wrapper model, each model with a smaller state space.
In the following we present a method to detect hazards for
a given model. Our synthesis is very pragmatical. Nev-
ertheless, we detected a number of hazards in our model
of the GALS wrapper: We detected a hazard in the input
port and some potential hazards in the time-out generator.
Additionally, we noticed that in the local clock generation
mode we could have potential hazards in the input port and
output port under very specific circumstances. Finally, we
observed potentially hazardous behavior of data-latch en-
able signal. Fortunately, in the usual application scenario
for GALS blocks no reachable state generates any of the de-
tected potential hazards. Nevertheless, in order to increase
reliability of the asynchronous wrapper we have fixed all
those potential hazards in the system. Without the formal
verification this would not have been feasible.
The hazard detection procedure works as follows: As
a first step the set of “candidates structures” for hazards
is identified. Candidates are the logic gates, flip-flops and
counters. Mutex and C-elements are no candidates; they are
hazard-free due to their distinguished structure.
In the second step all candidate structuresS are consid-
ered: S has a set of hazard markings as defined exemplarily
for the AND gate in section 3.6. The problem is to decide
whether or not the markings are reachable. We solved this
problem by help of the model checking tool LoLA: LoLA
detects whether or not a hazard markingM is reachable. If
reachable, LoLA constructs awitness, i.e. an occurrence
sequence from the initial marking toM . Each witness se-
quence corresponds to a sequence of signal edges of the
wrapper.
In a next step we tried to simulate those sequences of
signal edges, in order to confirm whether any “danger-
ous” state transition can occur in reality. Additionally we
searched for auxiliary constraints of that potential hazard
which have to be valid if the hazard reflects reality. With
these constraints the hazard marking was enhanced and a
new model checking run could be started to get a more pre-
cise witness. While doing this iteration most of the wit-
nesses could be excluded, because they violate known tim-
ing constraints, for instance.
For the reason of state space explosion we often com-
bined partial order reduction and the sweep-line method in
LoLA. Due to the operation of the sweep-line method a wit-
ness could not be constructed by LoLA, but the final mark-
ing. The respective hazard marking detected for is only a
subset of this final marking. So we had to enhance our haz-
ard marking with information of the final marking. Then,
we started another run by only using partial order reduction
to construct a witness. Sometimes we had to iterate that
procedure.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we suggested a pattern-based approach for
modelling an asynchronous wrapper of a fabricated GALS
system. We used Petri nets as modelling technique. The
model preserves all information that is necessary to detect
for hazards. Due to the design of our patterns the question
whether a potential hazard can occur in a gate is reduced
to the reachability of a particular marking. In fact, the lat-
ter is a well known model checking problem. For this pur-
pose, we used two different model checkers – LoLA, an ex-
plicit model checking tool and the symbolic model checker
SMV. In order to alleviate state space explosion we pre-
sented three techniques to reduce the model’s state space.
These techniques allowed us to detect several potential haz-
ards which could all be fixed in an improved version of the
wrapper.
From this case study, we have learned that the use of
patterns in different levels of abstraction is very useful and
helps reducing the model and also the state space. LoLA
proved useful in finding witnesses quickly, even without be-
ing capable of storing all of the reduced state space. This
is due to its powerful reduction techniques, particularly,
sweep-line method and partial order reduction. Using these
two techniques together instead of using only partial order
reduction, state space could be reduced by factor 2 – 10.
Especially, the recently proposed sweep-line method per-
formed very well. Our results furthermore show that ex-
plicit model checking techniques become quite powerful
and a stronger competition to symbolic model checkers in
the domain of hardware verification.
Further work includes ongoing analysis of the improved
wrapper. We will furthermore try to find a better abstraction
of the patterns to minimize the state space. It seems to be
possible to replace an abstract pattern of a gate by its cor-
responding concrete pattern instead of replacing patterns of
subcircuits as is done in the paper. In addition we will fo-
cus our work on bringing more causalities into the model in
order to simplify hazard detection.
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